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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law.- Taxation of Interstate Vendors by State
of Market - Petitioner, a Massachusetts corporation, by consent of
the State of Illinois, did retail selling from its branch office and ware-
house in Chicago. It carried on a variety of other activities there, the
most important of which was the negotiation and forwarding of orders
to be accepted or rejected by the home office. Such orders were filled
by shipment f.o.b. Worcester, Massachusetts, either directly to the
customer or via the Chicago office. The Chicago office did not inter-
vene when the buyer dealt directly with Worcester. Illinois levied
a business and occupation tax' measured by the entire gross income of
this company from sales to its inhabitants. Petitioner admitted the
income from its sales from locally warehoused stocks constitutionally
taxable, but took exception to the inclusion of sales where acceptance
of orders was at the home office and shipment was from the home
office in Massachusetts, through the branch office and those in which
the home office dealt directly with the purchaser, as exceeding the con-
stitutional range of the state's taxing power. The Illinois Supreme
Court sustained the entire tax on the basis that if licensed to do busi-
ness in the state, a situs is acquired which makes all sales to Illinois
customers taxable regardless of how made.2 Held: Judgment reversed
in part. Where a foreign corporation submits itself to the taxing power
of the state, it can only avoid taxation on sales by showing the par-
ticular transactions to be completely dissociated from local sales office
activity and interstate in nature. Norton Co. vs. Department of Reve-
nue of State of Illinois, 71 Sup. Ct. 377 (1951).
Though occupation or privilege taxes measured by gross receipts
have previously been upheld,' the instant case is to be distinguished
as one sustaining a tax by the state of market on an extraterritorial
vendor. The question naturally arises as to whether the Court has
enlarged the taxing powers of the state of destination, enabling it to
reach directly the seller with ability to pay.
Heretofore, this fertile field of taxation was denied the states of
market, since it would create risks of multiple taxation.4 Were the Court
I ILL. REv. STATS., 120.441 (1949) : "A tax is imposed upon persons engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state .. "2 Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 405 Ill. 314, 90 N.E. (2d) 737 (1950).
3 Western Live Stock et al. v. Bureau of Revenue et al., U.S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct.
546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938) ; cf. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459,
39 Sup. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed. 1084 (1919).
4 Western Live Stock et al. v. Bureau of Revenue et al., supra, note 3, at p. 256:
'The vice characteristic of those [gross receipt taxes] which havebeen held
invalid, is that they have placed on commerce burdens of such a nature as to
be capable, in point of sulstance, of having imposed with equal right by every
state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is be-
ing done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear
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to allow the imposition of the tax on the vendor by the state of destina-
tion, the seller's state where the property interest passes, might also
tax the company on that particular transaction, thereby creating a
multiple burden to which local business would not be subjected. This
contemplated risk constitutes a burden amounting to a regulation of
interstate commerce, notwithstanding the generality and uniformity
of tax.6 However, the Court will sustain occupation taxes measured
by gross receipts if they be fairly apportioned to the business done
within the state by a fair method of apportionment.7 In such cases it
is held that the incidence of the tax only remotely affects interstate
commerce, so that the tax on the seller measured by his gross receipts
is not upon the sales themselves, but on the privilege of transacting
an intrastate business.
By applying the same principles of generality, uniformity, appor-
tionment; and a fair method of determination thereof, the Court ex-
tended in the instant case the taxing power of the "market" states to
encompass the interstate vendor by resorting to the taxable event
theory." If an extraterritorial seller engages in some local activity that
may properly be termed "intrastate" and subject to the taxing power
of the state, it is a local taxable event. The focal point of constitu-
tionality then centers about apportionment, i.e., whether the interstate
sales have been clearly separated from those readily attributable to
the local business. The Court's attitude seems to be, in view of its
decisions in the New and Fair Deal era, to bring the large interstate
vendors under the taxing powers of the states and thereby mitigate
the advantages they hold over small business which generally might be
said to be intrastate. Therefore, where the Court can reasonably attri-
bute the proceeds of some of the sales to the local business, as in the
instant case where taxable business was mingled with that alleged not
to be taxable, it may favor the state over the vendor within the con-
stitutional standards announced. However, the Court at the same time
manifested its intention to adhere to these standards by striking down
the inclusion of those sales that are so clearly interstate in character
cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." Accord: Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 82 L.Ed. 1365 (1938).5McLeod, Commissioner of Revenues of Arkansas, v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322
U.S. 327, 64 Sup. Ct. 1023, 88 L.Ed. 1304 (1944). Contra: McGoldrick, CityComptroller v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 Sup. Ct. 388,
84 L.Ed. 565 (1940).
6 "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of
tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely
within the state." Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489,
497, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 694 (1887).
7Supra, note 3.
8 Brown, Robert C., State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-What Nouw., 48
Micr. L. REv. 899, 907, (1950).
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that the State could not reasonably attribute their proceeds to the local
business.9
The Court reiterated this stand when it declared unconstitutional,
in its most recent decision, 10 a Connecticut franchise tax measured by
the company's gross income derived from business within the state
as a tax on the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively
interstate in character. Though the case is clearly distinguishable, it
does emphasize that the local taxable event theory is not a cure-all"
to be used by the states of destination in tapping the income of inter-
state corporations.
The problem comes to mind, whether the mere maintenance of a
branch office for the purpose of solicitation of orders only would be
such a local incident that the sales attributable to it could be taxed.
As far back as 1887, the question presented itself, whether the
solicitation for an out-of-state seller, before the goods are introduced
into the state, could be a basis for taxation and the Court held:
"The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state
for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which
the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce.1
12
Justice Bradley's forceful opinion could very well be the basis for
sustaining this extension to centralized solicitation as an area immune
from the state taxing powers, because his business and economic
acumen was tailored for the progressive business practices of the mor-
row. However, in the field of use taxes, the states made a definite and
substantial gain, when the Court upheld an Iowa statute's which in-
cluded in its definition of a business, regular and continuous solicita-
tion.24 The issue has not been met, but a decision to this effect should
be forthcoming in the not too distant future. From the constitutional
standards as set forth at the present time by the Court on gross receipts
taxes, it would seem that a branch office solely for the purpose of
solicitation is not such a local activity as to come within a state's taxing
power, because the sales attributable to it are exclusively in interstate
commerce.
The instant case then did widen the field of taxation by the states
of market, through gross receipt taxes, but in so doing, the Court
9 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, Supra. "The only
items that are so clearly interstate in character that the State could not reason-
ably attribute its proceeds to the local business are orders sent directly to
Worcester by the customer and shipped directly to the customer from
Worcester."
10 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 71 Sup. Ct. 508 (1951).
" Supra, Note 10 (dissenting opinion).
1ZSupra, Note 6, at p. 497.
Is Iowa Code, 6943.102 (1939).
2 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 64 Sup.
Ct. 1028, 88 L. Ed. 1309 (1944). Contra: Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wright,
State Treasurer, et al., 383 11l. 363, 50 N.E. (2d) 509 (1939).
[VOL 35
RECENT DECISIONS
clarified its standards of constitutionality by manifesting their limita-
tions, and held that these standards as propounded in the states of
origin apply with equal force and effect in the states of market.
EDWARD A. DUDEK
Extradition-Extraditable Offense Under the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act-Petitioner Bledsoe, a resident of Oklahoma, was
arrested in that state on a warrant honoring a demand for extradition
made by the Governor of Kansas. The demand alleged that Petitioner
was charged in Kansas with the statutory offense of failure to provide
for the support and maintenance of his minor children, who were re-
siding in Kansas. Petitioner brought this action in habeas corpus,
alleging that (1) the Uniform Criminal Extradition Acte under which
his extradition is sought is unconstitutional because in conflict with
federal constitutional and statutory provisions relating to extradition;
and (2) Petitioner has never been in the State of Kansas and has
no agents in that State; he would not therefore be guilty of any crime
committed in Kansas. Held: Writ denied. The Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act is not repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and the ac-
tual presence of Petitioner within the demanding state at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense is not a prerequisite for his conviction
therefor. Ex parte Bledsoe, 227 P. 2d 680 (Okla., 1951).
The constitutionality of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
which has been adopted in nearly every state of the Union, is now
uniformly established and no longer open to serious questioning.
2
The same conclusion seems to be true in Wisconsin, which adopted the
Act in 1933
The provision of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act applicable
in the principal case reads as follows:
"Surrender of persons not fleeing from demanding State. The
Governor of this State may also surrender, on demand of the
Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this State
122 OKLA. STAT. 1949 Supp. Sec. 1141.1.
2 Ex parte Morgan, 194 P.2d 800 (Cal. App. 1948) ; Cassis v. Fair, 126 W.Va.
557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944) ; Ennist v. Baden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So.2d 160 (1946) ;
English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E.2d 898 (1947) ; Ex parte Camp-
bell, 147 Neb. 820, 25 N.W.2d 819 (1946); Osborn v. Harris, 203 P.2d 912
(Utah, 1949) ; In re Harris, 309 Mass. 180, 34 N.E2d 504 (1941). See also 22
Am. Jun., ExTRADmrnol, §9 and cases there cited. The Supreme Court of the
United States has never passed on the constitutionally of Sec. 6 specifically.
3 Wis. STATS. (1933) Chap. 364. The constitutionality of this Chapter has never
been squarely passed upon in Wisconsin. In Milwaukee County v. Van Den
Berg, 215 Wis. 519, 255 N.W. 65 (1934); State ex rel. Wells v. Hanley, 250
Wis. 374, 27 N.W.2d 373 (1947); and State ex rel. Kohl v. Kubiak, 255 Wis.
186, 38 N.%V2d 499 (1949), where individual sections of this chapter were con-
strued, the court appears to assume that the act is constitutional. A similar
assumption seems to be made by the Attorney General of Wisconsin in 21
O.A.G. 991,22 O.A.G. 755, and 23 O.A.G. 757.
